RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY

Introduction

The right to assemble peacefully, together with freedom of expression and freedom of association, rests at the core of any functioning democratic system. The legal regulation of freedom of assembly is a complex matter. A wide range of issues, both procedural and substantive, must be considered so as to best facilitate its enjoyment. Freedom of assembly is closely related to freedom of speech because most gatherings involve some form of protected speech.

Our constitution provides all citizens of this state with a set of basic rights called fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, so they cannot be taken away from us by ordinary law. Fundamental rights protected from administrative, legal and judicial attacks. All rights reserved by law. But the state may impose appropriate restrictions on these rights.

They have been classified under the six categories- Right to Equality, Right to Freedom, Right against Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural and Educational rights and Right to constitutional remedies.

Freedom of peaceful assembly, one of the fundamental rights, should be exercised as much as possible without restriction. Anything that is not allowed by law should be allowed, and those who want to collect should not be allowed. The idea that supports this freedom should be clear and unambiguous in the law.

As per the case of United States v. Cruikshank the Chief Justice Waite of American Supreme Court said that the very idea of a government, republican in form , implies a right on the part of citizens to meet peacefully for consultation in respect of public affairs.

Right of assembly is guaranteed under Article19(1)(b)“to assemble peaceably and without arms”. This right includes the rights to hold meetings and to take out processions.

In the US case of DeJonge v. Oregon, American Supreme Court observe that The right of assembly is as important as the rights of free speech and free press. It also includes the right to parade and demonstrate in public, therefore assembly usually occurs in parks, streets or sidewalks, however this can lead to interfering with the rights of others.

As a rational being, man desire to do many things, but in civil society his desires must be controlled, regulated, and coordinated when other individuals use similar desires. Therefore, the guarantee of each of the above rights is limited by the Constitution for the wider benefit of society.

1) The assembly must be peaceful and harmonious ,

2) It must be unarmed and not threatening the safety of the people;

3) Reasonable restrictions can be imposed under clause 3 of article 19.

This right is restrictive in nature. Article 19 (3) imposes restrictions which are in interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India and in public order. Section 141 defines unlawful assembly as an assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is against the public order like to commit trespass, to resist the execution of law or any legal process and other reasons.

Freedom of peaceful assembly is a fundamental human right that can be exercised by individuals and groups, unregistered associations, legal entities and legal entities. Assemblies can have several purposes, including expressing different, unpopular or minority views. The law can be an important element in the maintenance and development of culture, for example in preserving the identity of minorities. Protecting freedom of peaceful assembly is critical to creating a tolerant and pluralistic society in which groups of different beliefs, practices or policies can peacefully coexist.

Section 144provides that when a District Magistrate or other specified official, finds that there is nuisance or ‘apprehended danger’ which must be prevented or a speedy remedy is desirable, then she can direct any person to abstain from a certain act or can pass orders with respect to certain property in that person’s possession or management. A Magistrate can pass such a direction, if she considers that such direction is likely to prevent obstruction, annoyance, injury to any person lawfully employed or danger to human life, health or safety or disturbance of public tranquility or a riot or an affray.

An assembly should be considered peaceful if its organizers have recognized peaceful intentions and the assembly is not violent. The term “peaceful” should be construed to include behavior that may be annoying or offending, and even behavior that temporarily interferes with, hinders or hinders the activities of third parties.

All restrictions on freedom of assembly must be proportionate. Priority should always be given to the least intrusive means of achieving the legitimate aim pursued by the authorities. The principle of proportionality requires that the authorities routinely not impose restrictions that would substantially change the nature of events, such as relocating assemblies to less central areas of the city. The general application of legal restrictions is usually excessive and therefore not subject to the proportionality test, as the specific circumstances of the case have not been taken into account.

1.1: Historical Background & Development:

The British colonial ruler keenly regulated the ability to assemble. The imperative for this was the interest of the State in preventing organizing around the freedom movement. Five colonial-era statutes impact the freedom to assemble in modern India.

The Police Act, 1861 provided the police with the ability to ‘direct the conduct’ of assemblies and processions. Ones that were likely to cause ‘a breach of the peace’ were required to apply for licenses. The Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911 was to prevent public meetings that were likely to promote sedition or disaffection .

The Defence of India Ordinance, 1939 empowered the government to prohibit or regulate meetings, assemblies and processions. The Criminal Procedure of 1872 curtailed assemblies and was meant to provide for employing the military in aid of the civil power. This legislation continues in its amended form – the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance, 1942 passed in response to the Quit India Movement, continues in contemporary India. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958, grants the armed forces special powers in ‘disturbed areas’ in order to maintain public order. Such powers include the power to prohibit the assembly of five or more persons. To disperse such an ‘unlawful’ assembly, officers of the armed forces, after giving due warning, are allowed to fire upon or use such force even to the extent of causing death.

1. Various Provisions & Regulations With Leading Cases Regrading Right To Assembly :

Right to Assembly is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(b), which includes hold meetings and take out processions. But the right of assembly which is very idea of democracy is not an absolute right, as a rational being, man desire to do many things, but in civil society his desires must be controlled, regulated, and coordinated when other individuals use similar desires. Therefore, the guarantee of each of the above rights is limited by the Constitution for the wider benefit of society. There are two limitation for this Fundamental Rights i.e. 1) the assembly must be unarmed and 1) It must be peaceful without tumultuous and riotous character.

According to Article 19(3) the state can impose reasonable restrictions for the purpose of interest of public order or the sovereignty and integrity of India. As in case of United States v. Cruikshank the Chief Justice Waite of American Supreme Court said that the very idea of a government, republican in form , implies a right on the part of citizens to meet peacefully for consultation in respect of public affairs. So purpose behind public meetings is the education of public and the formation of opinion on religious, political, social and economic problems. Therefore the right of assembly has a close affinity with freedom of speech and expression.

Assembly which is of riotous and disorderly nature are not protected with this fundamental right, state can impose reasonable restriction under Article 19(3). No place in the Constitution the term Reasonable Restriction is defined and there is also not any abstract standard or any general pattern for reasonable restriction for all cases and situations. The cases may vary from situation to situation, right to right etc. According to the case of State Of Madras v. V.G. Row the reasonable restriction depend upon many things like purpose behind it, the extent and urgency of evils, proportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, the durations etc.

The reasonable restrictions are for the purpose of the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India or for public order. So, assembly for public meeting otherwise lawful assembly may be prevented in the case of emergency and if in the opinion of an appropriate authority to deem that restriction necessary. According to the case of Mahendra Bahadur Singh v State of the Supreme Court the maintenance of public order should be in advance so it is competent for a legislature to pass any law which powered the appropriate authority of take any anticipatory action or make any anticipatory restriction on any particular act in case of emergency for maintaining public order.

Till now the Supreme Court has not specifically explain or decided the term public order adequately but it is reasonable to consider the expression “public order” in same sense as mentioned in Article 19(2) i.e. Public peace, safety and tranquility. So, the any law which prohibits, restrict and regulate any assembly is valid if that restriction and prohibition is not unreasonable.

2.1: Law and Authority under other laws for controlling, restricting & regulating Lawful and Unlawful Assembly:

Any law which regulate and restrict any public meeting in public interest is valid unless that law or part of law is unreasonable. According to the Section 141, the assembly which have five or more members is unlawful assembly if they have common intention to do any illegal act. Mere assemblage of person is not illegal unless it’s have some common intention of illegal objective. The US constitution allow to bear arms but Indian Constitution does not guarantee the right to bear arms. So the Arms Act which prohibit the possession of arms is valid law.

As per the Prevention of Seditious Meeting Act, 1911 if state declare any or part of any area as proclaimed area then there will be restriction on Public meeting or for discussion on any subject which can cause disturbances or for public excitement or for exhibition and distribution of any written or printed matter or for many other similar type of activities unless the atleast 3 days advance written notice with intention to hold meeting and it’s time and places given to District Magistrate or Commission Of Police or with written prior permission.

To preclude the public disturbances of public peace, under Section 30 the police officer have power to issue license with conditions according to which assemblies or processions are to be take place. They should maintain order on public streets in vicinity and place of worship during the time of worship. By invoking Section 144the magistrate can also issue orders and imposes restrictions on holding public meetings. As per the Section 107 the magistrate can also obtain security for keeping peace from any person who is likely to commit a breach of peace even though that person has not actually committed the breach of peace then also magistrate can obtain security from his if the magistrate satisfy that the person is likely to commit a breach of peace.

If any assembly likely to cause a disturbance of peace, the police officer or magistrate can disperse any assembly under Section 129 despite of fact that that assembly is lawful or unlawful and on the lawful command of any police officer or magistrate if any assembly don’t get disperse then that will be treated as offence under Section 151.

In the case of Babulal Parade v. State Of Maharasthra the court held that holding any public meeting otherwise lawful may in emergency can be prevented if in the opinion of an appropriate authority found it necessary and also observe that citizen right of procession or to hold public meeting also derived from Article 19(1)(b) of peaceful assembly without armed force.

In the case of Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner Of Police court held that Power to regulate for authority includes the power to ask for prior permission for holding assemblies and procession because it is necessary to regulate the conduct and behavior or action of person constituting such assemblies or procession in order to safeguard the rights of citizens and in order to preserve public order.

3: Important Legal Issue & Historical Events with Problem ,Challenges & controversy:

The legal law on freedom of assembly is a complex issue. General scope of the subject, all procedures and importance, should be considered to further facilitate its enjoyment. Provisions relating to peaceful meetings on a wide range of laws including those governing the powers of law agencies, by-laws and counter-terrorism regulations and elections Regulations). The law on paper can’t provide prepared solutions and identify these differences and the many different state standards (especially in relation to democratic traditions, the rule of law and independence are justice). It's may not be possible to provide a standard "model law" which is applicable to all situation and clarify all issues with appropriate solutions.

In regulating freedom of assembly with a well-crafted law is crucial for giving discretion granted to the authorities. This requires governments and those involved in drafting the legislation consults with the persons and groups affected by new laws or amendments to the laws (including local human rights organizations) as an integral part of development trial. However, it is often not the text of the law that is at issue, but its implementation.

No place in the Constitution the term Reasonable Restriction is defined and there is also not any abstract standard or any general pattern for reasonable restriction for all cases and situations. The cases may vary from situation to situation, right to right etc. According to the case of State Of Madras v. V.G. Row the reasonable restriction depend upon many things like purpose behind it, the extent and urgency of evils, proportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, the durations etc.

3.1: Issue: 1 Can the state impose restriction on this right and use section 144 of CrPC for its own benefits and restrict citizens’ right to protest?

Article 19 (3) provides that nothing in the right to assemble peaceably shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of that right.

The restrictions pertaining to sovereignty and integrity were added after the adoption of the Constitution. Damodar Swarup Seth, a member of the Constituent Assembly of India argued that these restrictions regarding public order and morality ensure that the rights guaranteed under this article are placed at the mercy or the high-handedness of the state and that Supreme Court would have no alternative but to uphold the restrictive legislation. His fears were well founded, upon reviewing the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.

The CrPC provides that any Executive Magistrate or officer in charge of a police station may command any unlawful assembly, or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace to disperse. Failure by the assembly to disperse could result in use of force or arrests by the police. The CrPC also enables the Executive Magistrate to use the armed forces to disperse an assembly, in the interests of public security. Significantly, the CrPC mandates that there can be no prosecution against any person for acts done with regard to dispersal of an assembly, except with the sanction of the Government. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 punishes participants in an unlawful assembly with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine or both.

A religious procession on the 10th day of Mohurram was broken up by the police in Srinagar. The chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati, banned meetings and processions soon after assuming office but relented a few days later. She realised of course that such a blanket ban had no chance of survival in the courts. There is scope for judicial intervention in cases of bans for a term, but judicial intervention becomes in fructuous and futile if the state imposes a ban on a particular meeting at the last moment.

In 1991 the Madras High Court, on the petition of K Thiagarajan, struck down the order of the commissioner of police, Egmore, banning public meetings for 15 days. The petitioner had sought permission for a meeting to be held on September 27, 1991. Such bans were renewed as a matter of course. The court observed that merely under a pretext or assumption that there would be a breach of peace or a law and order problem would be created, summary rejection of an application for the conduct of a meeting could not be permitted. It deprecated the practice of renewing such ban orders fortnightly.

In a landmark judgment given by the Supreme Court on the incident that took place on the midnight of 4-5th June, 2011 at Ramlili Maidan, Delhi where Baba Ramdev and his supporters were carrying on a protest against corruption and black money. Their protest was against the government who failed in taking effective steps to curb the menace of black money and corruption in India. The apex court has held that the protest was peaceful.

In this regard, the Supreme Court observed that the decision to forcibly evict people sleeping at the Ramlila Maidan at midnight of 4-5th June 2011 taken by either the police independently or on consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs was arbitrary, abuse of power and improper. It was an invasion of legal protections available to the people present there. Thus the restriction was unwarrantedly executed and showed the might of the State.

The constitutionality of section 144 CrPC was challenged in Madhu Limaye v. the State of Maharashtra. The court framed the question as - whether the provisions of S. 144 and Chapter VIII of the Code can be said to be in the interests of public order in so far as the freedom of speech and expression, rights of assembly and formation of associations and unions are concerned? The Court refers to Justice Subba Rao’s much cited passage in the context of Article 19 (2) from Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia.

Public order is synonymous with public safety and tranquillity: it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State.

Here, Justice Subba Rao makes the point that public order is local and not national in nature. Yet, the Supreme Court does not connect this with the constitutionality of section 144. Instead it explains that section 144 is imposed depending on the urgency of the situation to prevent harmful occurrences. It reasons that the power must be used in a manner that would stand further judicial scrutiny into its ‘efficacy and extent of application’. It does not either explain or illustrate what this means.

Finally the Court in case of Balm Lai v. State of Maharashtra,finds section 144 to be constitutional and rejects the argument that the section is overboard .It has been held that Section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits the holding of meetings is not volatile of freedom of assembly. Under this section meetings can be banned and any assembly of more than five persons can be declared unlawful and then ordered to be dispersed.

3.2 ISSUE 2: Why does Article 19 did not guarantee a right to strike?

A rule that prohibited any form of demonstrations by government employees was examined. The court reasons that a government servant, did not lose her fundamental rights, and that the rule by prohibiting both orderly or disorderly demonstrations violates Article 19 (1) (b). The Court did not take issue with the notion that governmental employees as a class could have their rights or freedoms burdened. The apex court explains that “by accepting the contention that the freedoms guaranteed by Part III and in particular those in Article 19 (1) (a) apply to the servants of Government we should not be taken to imply that in relation to this class of citizens the responsibility arising from the official position would not by itself impose some limitations on the exercise of their rights as citizens”.

In a set of three cases, the Supreme Court has categorically denied any right to strike. The Petitioners sought a declaration by the Court that strikes by lawyers were illegal. The Court referred to Mahabir Prasad wherein it had held that a lawyer could not fail to appear in court on reasons of a strike or boycott. It also referred to the case of Ramon Services which upheld the principle that strikes by lawyers was illegal. It further noted that any resolutions passed by the Bar “expressing want of confidence” in judicial officers would amount to contempt of the Court.. Curiously, the court also declared that a strike could not be justified on any grounds save when there was an attack on the independence of the legal institutions.

Pursuant to a strike in the Posts and Telegraph Department proceedings were initiated and action taken against the Appellant. The Appellant challenged the action taken as well as the validity of the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance 1960, which prohibited strikes, as violating Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. The Court referred to All India Bank Employee’s Association and held that there was no fundamental right to strike.

T. K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu dealt with over two lakh employees being terminated from employment by the state government, for going on strike. The question before the Court, was whether these employees had a fundamental right to strike? The Court referred to Kameshwar Prasad, Radhey Shyam Sharma and All India Bank Employee’s Association, and held that Article 19 did

4: Critical Analysis of Some Important Foreign Cases Law:

4.1 Case : Bayan v. Ermita

Justic: Azcuna, J.

FACTS: The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola Bridge. Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue where BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Pre-emptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Bayan argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated the petitioner’s right, as an organizations and individuals, of peaceful assembly.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that B.P. No 880 is valid and constitutional. It is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes; otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

4.2 Case: IBP vs. Atienza

Justice: Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS: IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge. The mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. A criminal action was thereafter instituted against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to public assembly.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright the respondent Mayor gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavourable action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification

would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

Conclusion

Article 19 of the Constitution of India is one of the most important articles that constitute the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to every citizen of India. Article 19 (1) provides that all citizens have the right to freedom of expression and expression, assembly, association, movement, residence and the exercise of any occupation, trade, profession or profession. Article 19 (1) (b) guarantees to all citizens of India the right "to assemble peacefully and unarmed". This right includes the right to hold meetings and to conduct processions. The right is however subject to the restrictions that It must be unarmed and not threatening the safety of the people; The assembly must be peaceful and harmonious; Reasonable restrictions can be imposed under clause 3 of article 19 of Indian Constitution.

The right to assembly embodies the very idea of ​​a democratic government. Thus, Article 19 (1) (b) includes the right to hold meetings and lead processions. However, this right is not absolute, but restrictive. The assembly must be non-violent and we must not disturb public order. Disorderly and/or riotous will not be protected by this Article . Reasonable restrictions imposed by Article 19 (3) are in the interest of India's sovereignty and integrity or public policy. Article 19 (b) has always been a topic of discussion in the country. The Supreme Court has reviewed, examined and interpreted it several times. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 also deals with illegal assemblies.

Section 144 (6) Criminal Procedure Code 1973 authorizes the government to hold an assembly of 5 or more persons, in some cases an illegal assembly. Chapter viii of the Indian Penal Code 1860 states that the conditions under which conditions any assembly becomes “unlawful”. Under this section, an assembly of five or more persons becomes an illegal assembly if the common purpose of the persons making up the assembly is to a) to obtain the possession of any property using force, or to repel and resist the execution of any law or legal process b) to impel and coerce a person to do what he is not legally bound to do or omit which he is legally entitled to do, c) to commit any sort of mischief or criminal trespass, or overawe, d) that is, to appall and astonish the government by means of criminal force or show of criminal force or any public servant in the exercise of his lawful powers.

In many cases, the question arises in relation to Article 19 (1) (b), can the State restrict a person's right to protest? The Supreme Court ruling on the incident in 2011 June 4-5 At midnight on Ramlili Maidan in Delhi, where Baba Ramdev and his supporters staged a protest against corruption and black money. Their protest was directed against the government, which failed to take effective action to reduce the threat of black money and corruption in India. The High Court ruled that the protest took place peacefully. Satyagraha, which transcends the concept of passive resistance, is the essence of democracy. Saitagraha is not aggression, but non-violence, and its strength lies in its truth and ability to fight for it. In this decision, the Supreme Court upheld the right to peaceful protest as a constitutional right, and the right to assemble and demonstrate dharna is a key feature of an effective democratic system. People in a democracy have the right to speak out against government decisions and unreasonable actions or to express their views on any issue of national importance. The government has a duty to respect and promote the exercise of such rights. Recently, however, political forces have used police powers to prevent people from exercising their constitutional right to peaceful assembly. In this case, police powers were also used to indicate that the size of the protest should be small and not very large. Article 144 of the RF Code of Criminal Procedure was also unlawfully introduced. In this regard, the Supreme Court noted that the decision to forcibly evict people sleeping on Ramlil Maidan at midnight in 2011. June 4-5, Adopted by the police independently or in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior, was arbitrary, abusive. government and inappropriate. It was an invasion of the tools available to the people there. Thus, the restriction was unreasonably enforced and demonstrated the power of the state.

However, following these observations, the decision became strange and he said that it was the duty of each protester to follow all the legitimate instructions. Neither the introduction of Article 144 nor the revocation of the permit or the forced eviction of the protesters were legal, why did the protesters have to make such an order? A protester, organizing a peaceful protest in accordance with his constitutional rights, also has the right not to make an illegal order denying him the right to protest. If an order is found to be illegal, it should not risk being penalized. However, it is alluded to that every time the state overwhelms a person's fundamental right to protest, he must immediately make these orders, otherwise he should be punished.

But a citizen cannot be waived as a fundamental right simply because the state decides to suspend their right to complain. The ruling upheld the right to complain as a fundamental right of speech and assembly, but put forward a highly questionable proposal, saying that once the right to complain has been denied, the prosecutor must accept This rejection or neglect of risk contributes to the discrimination. Police. This part of the judgment needs to be debated and discussed at length to find its shortcomings and should be reconsidered.

So, Freedom to Assemble is a special interest of Constitutional law, as it is enabled and restricted the constitutional text and criminal procedure law. As long as there is a constitution provision as a right, procedural provisions severely limit this freedom, by empowering the state to regulate its feelings and consistently shorten the exercise. This rather contradictory approach reflect the colonial legacy and the unquestioning adoption of most of the provisions of the 1872 Code of Criminal Procedure by the contemporary Indian State. It makes sense for the colonial state to maintain a legal framework all kinds of organizations, meetings, associations that allow rapid deterioration or a potentially dangerous mount. It's unfortunate that India is modern It continues this legacy in the context of both collective rights and associations.

The Supreme Court, in the case of Himat Lal K. Shah v. Police Commissioner, the question of whether prior written consent is required before a public meeting was held on a broken street, Article 19 (1) rights of the Petitioners? This rule here, enabled the Commissioner or an officer designated by her to refuse permission for such a meeting. Chief Justice Sikri writing for the majority distinguished between a statutory provision that enabled the regulation of conduct of persons in assemblies and processions and a rule that enabled the refusal of permission to hold public meetings on public streets without guidelines being prescribed for the officer responsible. He found no fault with the prior permission requirement, as according to him the right which flows from Art. 19 ( 1) (b) is not a right to hold a meeting at any place and time. It is a right which can be regulated. He invalidated the arbitrary powers conferred on the officer authorized by the Commissioner of Police. In Kameshwar Prasad v State of Bihar, a rule that prohibited any form of demonstrations by government employees was examined. The court reasons that a government servant, did not lose her fundamental rights, and that the rule by prohibiting both orderly or disorderly demonstrations violates Article 19 (1) (b) . The Court did not take issue with the notion that governmental employees as a class could have their rights or freedoms burdened. The apex court explains that by accepting the contention that the freedoms guaranteed by Part Ill and in particular those in Article 19 (1) (a) apply to the servants of Government we should not be taken to imply that in relation to this class of citizens the responsibility arising from the official position would not by itself impose some limitations on the exercise of their rights as citizens. So, Article 19 (3) of the Constitution provides that nothing in the right to assemble peaceably shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of that right. The restrictions pertaining to sovereignty and integrity were added after the adoption of the Constitution.

Bibliography:

Books

Bakshi, P.M., The Constitution of India, Universal Law Publishing Co. Delhi, (10th ed.), 2010. 9

Basu, D.D., Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. 2, 8th Ed., Wadhwa and Co. Law Publishers, New Delhi, 2007. 12

Dhamija Ashok, Constitution, Wadhwa Nagpur, (1st ed.), 2007. 11

Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, Universal Law Publishing, Lexis Nexis (6th ed. reprint), 2011. 8

Saharay, H.K., The Constitution of India: An Analytical Approach, Eastern Law House, (3rd ed.), 2002 6

Saharay, H.K., The Constitution of India: An Analytical Approach, Eastern Law House, (3rd ed.), 2002. 6

Shukla,V.N., Constitution of India,(Edited by M.P Singh),Eastern Book Company, (13th Ed.) 2019, Pg:161. 10

Cases and Status Refered:

Cases

Babulal Parade v. State Of Maharasthra, AIR 1973, SC 87. 10

Balm Lai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 S.C. 884. 14

Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006. 16

DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 ,57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278, 1937. 5

Harish Uppal v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1166. 15

Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner Of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227: AIR 1973,SC 87. 10

Integrated Bar Of Philippines V. Manila Mayor Jose 'Lito' Atienza, Gr No. 175241, 2010-02-24. 17

Kameshwar Prasad v State of Bihar ,EC, 1962 AIR 1166, 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369. 15

Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. State,AIR 1953 MB 236. 9

Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Post-Master General , EC 1965 AIR 311, 1964 SCR (7) 403. 15

Re-Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt v.Home Secretary And Ors, Suo Motto WP (CRL.) NO. 122 OF 2011 14

State Of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952, SC:196, 1952 SCR 597. 8

T. K. Rangarajan V. Government Of Tamil Nadu, Case No.: Appeal (Civil) 5556 Of 2003. 15

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 , Otto 542; 23 L. Ed. 588; 1875 U.S. 4

United States v. Cruikshank,23 L Ed 599:92 US 542,552 (1875). 8

Statutes

Article 19 (1)(b), Indian Constitution Act 1950. 5

Article 19(1)(b) ,Indian Constitution Act 1950. 11

Article 19(1)(b), Indian Constitution Act 1950. 8

Section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 10

Section 129, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 10

Section 144 (1) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 13

Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 10

Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. 6

Section 151, Indian Penal Code 1860. 10

Section 30 (1), Police Act 1861. 6

Section 30, Police Act 1861. 10

Cases

Babulal Parade v. State Of Maharasthra, AIR 1973, SC 87. 10

Balm Lai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 S.C. 884. 13

Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006. 15

DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 ,57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278, 1937. 4

Harish Uppal v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1166. 14

Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner Of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227: AIR 1973,SC 87. 10

Integrated Bar Of Philippines V. Manila Mayor Jose 'Lito' Atienza, Gr No. 175241, 2010-02-24. 16

Kameshwar Prasad v State of Bihar ,EC, 1962 AIR 1166, 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369. 14

Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. State,AIR 1953 MB 236. 9

Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Post-Master General , EC 1965 AIR 311, 1964 SCR (7) 403. 14

Re-Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt v.Home Secretary And Ors, Suo Motto WP (CRL.) NO. 122 OF 2011 13

State Of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952, SC:196, 1952 SCR 597. 8

T. K. Rangarajan V. Government Of Tamil Nadu, Case No.: Appeal (Civil) 5556 Of 2003. 14

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 , Otto 542; 23 L. Ed. 588; 1875 U.S. 4

United States v. Cruikshank,23 L Ed 599:92 US 542,552 (1875). 8

Statutes

Article 19 (1)(b), Indian Constitution Act 1950. 4